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Abstract—We propose a straightforward technique to provide peer-to-peer security in mobile networks. We show that far from being a
hurdle, mobility can be exploited to set up security associations among users. We leverage on the temporary vicinity of users, during
which appropriate cryptographic protocols are run. We illustrate the operation of the solution in two scenarios, both in the framework of
mobile ad hoc networks. In the first scenario, we assume the presence of an offline certification authority and we show how mobility
helps to set up security associations for secure routing; in this case, the security protocol runs over one-hop radio links. We further
show that mobility can be used for the periodic renewal of vital security information (e.g., the distribution of hash chain/Merkle tree
roots). In the second scenario, we consider fully self-organized security: Users authenticate each other by visual contact and by the
activation of an appropriate secure side channel of their personal device; we show that the process can be fuelled by taking advantage
of trusted acquaintances. We then show that the proposed solution is generic: It can be deployed on any mobile network and it can be
implemented either with symmetric or with asymmetric cryptography. We provide a performance analysis by studying the behavior of
the solution in various scenarios.
Index Terms—Mobile ad hoc networks, network-level security and protection.

1 INTRODUCTION
PEER-TO-PEER security is considered to be more difficult toachieve than traditional security based on central
servers. One would expect the problem to become even
more challenging when users are allowed to move around
and to be connected only sporadically. Indeed, according to
common belief, wireless communication and mobility are at
odds with security: Jamming or eavesdropping is easier on
a wireless link than on a wired one, notably because such
mischief can be perpetrated without physical access or
contact; likewise, a mobile device is more vulnerable to
impersonation and to denial of service attacks.
The security architectures of existing mobile networks
are highly centralized (as are their static, wireline counter-
parts). For example, the security of GSM relies on a key,
shared by the subscriber and the operator, which is
established at the time the contract is signed; the security
of Third Generation cellular networks is based on the same
principle. Another example is the Wireless Transport Layer
Security (WTLS) protocol, aimed at providing secure Web
access from a mobile device: The servers are authenticated
by a certificate of their public key, delivered by a well-
established certification authority.
Both examples show that the driving security concern
has been to serve the interest of specific organizations: In
the first case, the security system guarantees an operator
that only legitimate subscribers can make use of the
communication service it provides; in the second case, it
lets an e-business company claim to its own customers that
they are connected to the right Web server and that the
message exchange is protected.
So far, nothing has been proposed for peer-to-peer security
in mobile networks. We will show that, far from being a
hurdle, mobility can in fact help security by enabling basic
functions such as authentication and key establishment. We
will illustrate the principles of our solution in two scenarios,
both in the area of mobile ad hoc networks.
The first scenario corresponds to situations where an
(offline) authority provides the authorization to each mobile
node to join the network, but it does so only at the
initialization of each node; when in each others’ radio
range, nodes mutually authenticate and set up shared keys;
this approach allows the nodes to join the network at
different times (in general, the authority does not even
know how many nodes will eventually be present in the
network). An important use of this approach is to secure
routing, as the direct (one-hop) establishment of security
associations avoids relying on routing for the establishment
of security associations (i.e., this approach breaks the
routing-security interdependence cycle [21], [4]). Another
important application of this approach is to enable the
periodic renewal of vital security information (e.g., the
distribution of hash chain/Merkle tree roots).
In the second scenario, we consider fully self-organized
security: In such a setting, there is no central authority
whatsoever, and the establishment (and release) of security
associations is purely based on mutual agreement between
users; when they are close to each other, users can activate a
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secure side channel between their personal devices to
authenticate each other and set up shared keys.
In [12], we have developed this initial idea by quantifying
the benefits of mobility and by introducing a mechanism
called “friends” that supports the establishment of security
associations even between nodes that do notmeet physically.
Here, we further extend this work by proposing protocols
that allow the implementation of our system with both
symmetric and public-key cryptography.
The organization of the paper is the following: In
Section 2, we survey the related work. In Section 3, we
explain how security associations are created based on
encounters and we provide the cryptographic protocols. In
Section 4, we propose several applications of our approach.
In Section 5, we study the pace at which the security
associations are created. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 6.
2 STATE-OF-THE-ART
In [29], Zhou and Haas propose a distributed public-key
management service for ad hoc networks in which the
functionality of the central authority is distributed over a
subset of nodes through a threshold cryptography scheme.
A more recent proposal by Luo et al. [22] describes a similar
approach that provides a more fair distribution of the
burden by allowing any node to carry a share of the private
key of the service.
A different technique, proposed by Asokan and Ginz-
boorg [1] is based on a shared password. In this approach,
nodes willing to establish a secure session must share a
prior context (in the example they “share” a room in which
they are located). A fresh password is chosen and shared
among users (e.g., it is written on a blackboard). From this
weak password, the users derive a strong key, by making
use of a password-authenticated key exchange.
Another approach, originally designed for the address
ownership problem in Mobile IPv6, is described by
Montenegro and Castelluccia in [23] and by O’Shea and
Roe in [24]. Their idea is to derive the IP address of the node
from its public key: First, the public key is hashed with a
cryptographic hash function, and then, (part of) the hash
value is used as part of the IP address of the node.
In [15], Eschenauer and Gligor propose a random key
predistribution scheme for sensor networks. Its operation is
briefly described as follows: A random pool of keys is
selected from the key space. Each sensor node receives a
random subset of keys from the key pool before deploy-
ment. Any two nodes able to find one common key within
their respective subsets can use that key as their shared
secret to initiate communication. This approach is extended
by Chan et al. in [6].
In [9], we propose a self-organized public-key manage-
ment system for ad hoc networks, which is similar to PGP in
the sense that users issue certificates for each other based on
their personal acquaintances. In that system, each user
maintains a local certificate repository and users’ mutual
authentication is performed through certificate chaining.
To the best of our knowledge, the only research
published so far that shows that proximity of devices can
help to set up security associations and to perform
authentication is presented in [3], [7]. However, these
proposals deal with the application level security and do
not show how the mobility of the nodes can be used to
progressively reinforce the security of the network (e.g., by
increasing the security of routing).
Finally, we must mention the works of Grossglauser and
Tse [16], and Grossglauser and Vetterli [17], Dubois-Ferriere
et al. [14]; these papers show that mobility can help to
increase the per-user throughput in ad hoc networks and to
disseminate destination location information without in-
curring any communication overhead to the network.
3 MECHANISMS TO ESTABLISH SECURITY
ASSOCIATIONS
In this section, we first describe our system model and then
we propose the mechanisms for the establishment of
security associations.
3.1 System Model
In this work, we consider and discuss two scenarios: The
first assumes the presence of a trusted authority, whereas
the second is fully self-organized.
In the first scenario, we consider an ad hoc network of
mobile nodes, controlled by an (offline) central authority.
This means that the authority controls network member-
ship. We assume that each node has a unique identity
(e.g., assigned to it by the authority). Furthermore, each
node holds a certificate signed to it by the authority that
binds the node’s identity and its public key. We also
assume that each node holds a correct public key of the
authority, so that it can verify the correctness of the
certificates that other nodes hold.
In the second scenario, we consider an ad hoc network of
mobile nodes, where each node represents a user equipped
with a personal mobile device. We assume that each
legitimate user has a single device. In this scenario, we
consider that the network is fully self-organized, meaning
that there is no infrastructure (hence, no PKI), no central
authority, no centralized trusted third party, no central
server, and no secret share dealer, even in the initialization
phase. A fundamental assumption is that each node is its
own authority domain.
We assume, in both scenarios, that each node is able to
generate cryptographic keys, to check signatures and, more
generally, to accomplish any task required to secure its
communications (including to agree on cryptographic
protocols with other nodes).
3.2 Mechanisms
If a node u possesses a certificate signed by the central
authority that binds node vwith its (v’s) public key, then we
say that there exists a one-way security association from u
to v. Two one-way security associations between nodes u
and v (one in each direction) constitute a two-way security
association between the nodes. Equally, if u and v share a
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secret key kuv, we say that there exists a two-way security
association between u and v.
If public-key cryptography is used, a (two-way) security
association between two nodes u and v is represented by
triplet ðU; ku; auÞ at the side of v and triplet ðV ; kv; avÞ at
the side of u, where U and V are the names of the users that
are associated with nodes u and v, ku and kv are the public
keys of u and v, and au and av are the node addresses of u
and v, respectively. Once nodes u and v have established a
security association between them, they can set up secure
communication channels that protect the integrity and
confidentiality of the exchanged messages. In fact, for
efficiency reasons, u and v may want to use symmetric key
cryptography for the protection of their messages; in this
case, they establish short-term symmetric keys (session
keys) using the public keys in the security association. In
this way, the nodes establish short-term symmetric-key
security associations, which they can use for efficient secure
routing [19].
Similarly, if symmetric-key cryptography is used, a
security association between nodes u and v is represented
by triplet ðU; kuv; auÞ at the side of v and triplet ðV ; kuv; avÞ
at the side of u, where kuv is a symmetric key shared by u
and v. In the symmetric-key-based approach, we consider
security associations to be always two-way; it is not possible
to establish a one-way security association.1
The establishment of security associations differs in the
authority-based and in the fully self-organized scenario.
In the authority-based scenario, when two nodes move
into the power range of each other, they will exchange
certificates that contain their public keys and establish a
security association.
In the self-organized scenario, when they meet, users are
obviously given the possibility to visually identify each
other. The decision to set up a security association between
two nodes is based on this physical encounter. To support
this mechanism, we assume that each device is equipped
with a short range connectivity system (e.g., infrared or
wire). We call a channel established by this mechanism a
secure side channel. A secure side channel can only be point-
to-point and works only when the nodes are within a
“secure range” of each other. We consider this assumption
to be realistic, as almost all personal mobile devices are
equipped with infrared interfaces. We assume that the
activation of the side channel is made by both users
consciously and simultaneously. When activating the side
channel, the users simultaneously associate the name (or the
face) of the other person to the established security
association. This operation is very similar to the exchange
of business cards; in fact, it can even be transparently
combined with the exchange of electronic business cards
(e.g., exchange of vCards2 between PDAs). If a user wants
to establish a security association with a user-independent
device (e.g., a printer), she will visually identify the device
and bind its identity to the context in which the device
operates. In this paper, however, we focus on the establish-
ment of security associations between users’ personal
communication devices. These encounters make it possible
for a user to associate a face to a given identity (and to a
given public key), thus solving many of the classical
problems of security in distributed systems (e.g., imperso-
nation attacks and Sybil attacks [13]).
We assume that an adversary can eavesdrop on all radio
links and can manipulate messages in all kinds of ways.
However, the adversary cannot modify messages trans-
mitted over the secure side channel. Note that we do not
require the secure side channel to protect the confidentiality
of exchanged information. Finally, we consider that an
adversary can have at his disposal as many fake devices as
he wants.
Themajor difference between the fully self-organized and
the authority-based approach stands in user involvement: In
a fully self-organized approach, users need to establish
security associations consciously, whereas in the authority-
based approach, users do not need to be aware of the
establishment of the security associations, as it is done
automatically by their nodes. The use of either of these
approaches strongly depends on the purpose of the network.
Typically, the self-organized approach is useful in securing
personal communications on the application level, whereas
the authority-based approach is used to secure networking
mechanisms such as routing. We will now address the
public-key approach, and then the symmetric one.
3.2.1 Public-Key Approach
We focus on the establishment of security associations in
the fully self-organized model. In the authority-based
model, two nodes can establish a security association by
exchanging their certificates; this is rather straightforward
and we do not detail it further.
Three mechanisms support the establishment of new
security associations (Fig. 1). Mechanism (a) is used when
two nodes u and v are in the vicinity of each other, and it
consists of u and v exchanging their triplets using the secure
side channel. Since the secure side channel ensures the
integrity of the exchanged messages, it precludes the
possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack. This guarantees
a secure binding between the received user name, public
key, and node address. In addition, the user can easily
verify the validity of the received name because the name
should correspond to the person present at the encounter.
The node can also verify that the other node indeed
possesses the private key that belongs to the received
public key by executing a simple challenge-response
protocol. Finally, the node address can be verified against
the public key. The verification of the node address against
the public key is necessary, notably for secure routing. One
possible solution is to generate the node address from its
public key3 by making use of a technique similar to CAM
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1. In practice, the nodes may derive subkeys from the shared symmetric
key of the security association, where each subkey is used in one direction
only and perhaps only for a specific security service (e.g., either for integrity
or for confidentiality, but not for both); this is a policy issue, out of the scope
of our discussion.
2. http://www.imc.org/pdi/.
3. If the node has several public keys, then the node address is generated
from a designated one.
[24] or SUCV [23]. In this way, node addresses are bound to
public keys in a verifiable way. Note, however, that a
malicious node may generate several public keys and the
corresponding node addresses and distribute them to other
nodes. Whether this is a problem very much depends on
how the routing protocol is secured; a thorough study of
this issue is left for future work. In the authority-based
model, this is not a problem, as the node address is bound
to the public key of the node by the certificate issued by the
authority; this removes the need for CAM, SUCV, or similar
mechanisms.
Protocol 1 shows a possible implementation of the direct
establishment of security associations.
Protocol 1: Direct Establishment of a Security
Association.
msg1 (secure side ch.) u! v : auju ¼ hðrujU jkujauÞ
msg2 (secure side ch.) v! u : avjv ¼ hðrvjV jkvjavÞ
msg3 (radio ch.) u! v : rujU jkujau
msg4 (radio ch.) v! u : rvjV jkvjav
u : hðrvjV jkvjavÞ ¼ v?; V ?;
matchðkv; avÞ?
v : hðrujU jkujauÞ ¼ u?; U?;
matchðku; auÞ?
msg5 (radio ch.) u! v : uðrvjUjV Þ
msg6 (radio ch.) v! u : vðrujV jUÞ:
In Protocol 1, u and v first generate random numbers ru
and rv, respectively, and exchange, through the secure side
channel, their addresses au and av and the cryptographic
hash values u ¼ hðrujU jkujauÞ and v ¼ hðrvjV jkvjavÞ of
their random numbers and triplets. After this initial
exchange, u and v send messages to each other through
the radio interface (since they have obtained each other’s
node address in the first two messages). They exchange
their random numbers and triplets, and each of them
verifies if the hash value of the received random number
and triplet is equal to the received hash value u (or v). If
this is the case, they can be sure that they have received the
random number and the triplet from the party with which
they exchanged the first messages through the secure side
channel. The random numbers serve as nonces and
guarantee the freshness of the subsequent messages. Now,
both users can verify if the received user name corresponds
to the other party and both nodes can verify if the received
node address matches the received public key. Finally, the
nodes generate and send to each other a signature (ðÞ) on
the received random number and the user names in order to
prove that they possess the private keys that belong to the
exchanged public keys.
With Mechanism (b), two nodes u and v can establish a
security association if they have a common friend f . A
simple solution is the following: Since f knows the triplets
of both u and v, it can issue (on request from u and/or v)
fresh certificates for both triplets and send them to v and u,
respectively, via the network. Both u and v know the public
key of f and they also trust f , therefore, they can both verify
the received certificates and will accept the information
therein if the verification is successful.
Mechanism (c) is a combination of the friendship
relationships and the encounters, and it establishes only a
one-way security association: If nodes u and f are friends
and f has obtained the triplet of v in an encounter with v,
then f can issue (on request from u) a fresh certificate for
the triplet of v, and send this certificate to u via the network.
Since u knows the public key of f , and also trusts f , she can
verify the received certificate and accept the received triplet
if the verification is successful. A two-way security
association between nodes u and v is then established as a
combination of two one-way security associations (from u
to v and from v to u).
The protocols corresponding to Mechanisms (b) and (c)
are straightforward and we do not detail them.
3.2.2 Symmetric-Key Approach
The mechanisms used in the symmetric-key approach are
similar; they can be applied to both fully self-organized and
to the authority-controlled networks.
The first mechanism (Fig. 1, Mechanism (a)) is the direct
establishment through the side channel: When the nodes
are in the vicinity of each other, they can exchange, through
the side channel, their user names and node addresses, and
additional data that allow them to compute a shared secret.
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Fig. 1. Three mechanisms to create new security associations using
(a) the secure side channel, (b) a common friend, and (c1) and (c2) the
combination of the first two approaches (mechanism (c1) is used only in
the public-key-based approach). In the text, we refer to mechanisms (c1)
and (c2) as mechanism (c).
It is important to note, however, that in a pure symmetric-
key approach, setting up a shared secret between two
parties always requires a confidential channel between
them. This means that in this case, the side channel must
ensure not only the integrity but also the confidentiality of
messages. Like in the public-key implementation, the users
can verify the received names through personal encounters.
The node addresses, on the other hand, can be verified
against the received (and verified) names.
Mechanism (b) supports the establishment of security
associations between two nodes u and v via a common
friend f . By assumption, f already has a security association
with both u and v, meaning that it has symmetric keys
established with them. In addition, f is trusted by both u
and v. Therefore, to establish a session key between u and v,
well-known symmetric-key protocols can be used, where f
plays the role of the trusted (key) server. The session key
can be generated either by f who would send it to both u
and v (like in the Kerberos protocol), or by u or v, in which
case f would be used as a trusted relay (like in the Wide-
Mouth-Frog protocol [5]).
Finally, Mechanism (c) can be used when two nodes u
and v do not have a common friend, or have a common
friend f but do not want f to know their shared secret key.
Like in the public-key-based approach, Mechanism (c)
combines the first two mechanisms (encounters and
friends). Let us assume that u has a friend f who has
already set up a security association with v using the first
mechanism. Similarly, let us assume that v has a friend g
who has set up a security association with u using the first
mechanism. Now, u and v can set up a security association
using f and g by u generating key contribution ku and
sending it to v via g, v generating key contribution kv and
sending it to u via f , and then both u and v computing a
common value kuv from ku and kv. Protocol 2 illustrates this
in more detail. In this protocol, nodes u and v first exchange
the names of their friends to be used in the protocol as
trusted relays, and two nonces ru and rv that are used to
guarantee the freshness of subsequent messages. Then, u
generates some random key ku and sends it to v via g (msg3
and msg4), and v generates some random key kv and sends
it to u via f (msg3’ and msg4’). Here, dx!y is a direction bit
that indicates that the message goes from x to y (and not
from y to x).4 req and rep are bits that indicate that the
message is a request to a friend or a reply from a friend,
respectively. We need these bits because every node can
play either the role of a requesting node (u and v) or the role
of a friend (f and g) and, thus, we must indicate not only
that this is a message from x to y but also that x is the
requesting node and y is the friend (or vice versa). Finally, u
and v compute a common value kuv from ku and kv using a
publicly known pseudorandom function h (e.g., a hash
function).
Protocol 2: Friend-Assisted Establishment of a Security
Association.
msg1 u! v : f; ru
msg2 v! u : g; rv
msg3 u! g : u; fdu!g; req; v; ku; rvgkug
msg4 g! v : g; fdg!v; rep; u; ku; rvgkvg
msg3’ v! f : v; fdv!f ; req; u; kv; rugkvf
msg4’ f ! u : f; fdf!u; rep; v; kv; rugkuf
u; v : kuv ¼ hðku; kvÞ:
An interesting feature of the protocol is that it replaces a
single trusted party with two parties trusted by one entity
each. If f and g are not colluding, then none of them has
enough information to compute kuv. In addition, both u and
v trust at least one of them for not colluding.
4 APPLICATIONS
In this section, we describe several applications of our
approach.
4.1 Key Establishment
The mobility-assisted establishment of security associations
can be notably used to secure routing, or simply to protect
the confidentiality of user personal communication.
In the first case, this can help to establish sufficient
security associations to enable secure routing, thus by
breaking the routing-security interdependence cycle [21]:
Security associations cannot be established over multiple
hops as the routing protocol does not operate securely
(because security associations are not established yet).
A conventional solution to the routing-security inter-
dependence includes preloading pairwise keys in all nodes
to create all the security associations at the initialization.
However, this approach prevents the insertion of new
nodes in the network and is demanding in terms of storage.
Other solutions [21] rely on an online key distribution
center to initially distribute keys and to handle new nodes.
Although effective, this approach requires a costly initi-
alization phase and the use of complex security protocols.
Another possible solution is to make use of cryptographi-
cally verifiable identifiers such as SUCV or CAM [4]. The
advantage of this and similar approaches is that all public
keys can be simply verified against nodes’ identifiers. The
disadvantage is that the nodes cannot change (revoke) their
public keys without changing the identifiers. Other ap-
proaches to key distribution may include: network-wide or
local broadcast or multicast of public or TESLA [25] keys,
either by the servers or by the nodes themselves. These
approaches are very effective, but costly in terms of
communication overhead. The main drawback of these
schemes is that even if public keys are distributed to all
nodes, routing will not be efficient due to the high cost of
public key cryptography, or at least until symmetric keys
are established.
Our mobility-based approach is different in the sense
that it enables a flexible setup of security associations,
simplifies the introduction of new nodes in the network,
requires at most an offline authority, and enables the
establishment of secret keys between all pairs of nodes; a
drawback is that the establishment of the security associa-
tions requires some time, as detailed in Section 5. Because of
this, we see our approach as a standalone solution in some
applications, but also as a complementary solution to other
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4. Note that since messages are always encrypted with a symmetric key
kxy, the only ambiguity could be the direction.
key management solutions in other applications. Further-
more, as we showed in our previous work [10], in some
scenarios, it is sufficient that only a small percentage (less
than 40 percent) of security associations are established
between the nodes to enable secure routing.
If used to secure users’ personal communication, our
mobility-based scheme can enable mutual authentication of
users that have already met. Moreover, it can also be used
to fuel the creation of certificate graphs; in that case,
authentication can be performed through certificate chain-
ing, as described in [9].
4.2 Periodic Distribution of Security Material
Besides key establishment, mobility can also help to
periodically distribute security material. Notably, it can be
used for the distribution of hash chain and Merkle tree roots
[26]. Hash chains and Merkle trees enable authentication of
values and are typically used to ensure message freshness
and authentication. They have been used to secure various
aspects of routing. Hauser et al. [18] present an efficient
mechanism for the authentication of link state routing
updates. Zhang [28] improves this mechanism and presents
a chained Merkle-Witnernitz one-time signature. Hu et al.
[19] propose a set of efficient security mechanisms for ad
hoc networking, which make use of hash chains and Merkle
hash trees. They also use hash chains to efficiently secure
routing in ad hoc networks: to secure distance vector
routing updates in SEAD [20] and to prevent malicious
changes of hop count in Ariadne [21]. Finally, hash chains
and Merkle hash trees are used to prove encounters
between the nodes in mobile ad hoc networks [8].
All mentioned mechanisms require each node to dis-
tribute its hash chain or hash tree roots in an authentic way
to every other node in the network. Moreover, they require
the root of a new chain/tree to be distributed to every node,
before the values from the old chain/tree are exhausted.
This problem is especially important in mobile ad hoc
networks, in which broadcasts of roots/chains may be
costly, or infeasible (if only symmetric-key cryptography is
used for authentication). We thus propose a mobility-based
approach similar to our key establishment scheme that
works as follows:
Each node maintains two hash chains: an active and a
pending one. We assume that the root of the active hash
chain/tree has already been distributed; thus, the active
hash chain/tree can be used for the security application of
interest as described earlier. In contrast, the root of the
pending hash chain/tree has not been distributed yet, and
the node has to distribute it to every other node in the
network before the active hash chain/tree runs out of
elements. When the root of the pending hash chain/tree has
been distributed, the node can turn the pending hash
chain/tree into an active state. At the same time, the node
would generate a new pending hash chain/tree and begin
distributing its root. Putting in place the pending hash
chains/trees while using the active ones ensures continuous
operation of the system.
In our scheme, the root of the pending hash chain/tree is
disseminated in an authentic way when nodes encounter
each other. Together with the root of the pending hash
chain/tree, the nodes also disseminate a time t in the future.
The value of t should be estimated in such a way that the
active hash chain/tree does not run out of elements by t and
the root of the pending hash chain/tree is distributed to all
other nodes by time t. Then, at t, the pending hash chain/
tree becomes active, and a new pending hash chain/tree is
generated; the process is then repeated.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an estimate of the pace at which
security associations are created. We assume that, initially,
each node established security associations only with its
friends; we further assume that each node has the same
number of friends.
In our analysis, we will observe the following values: the
convergence rðtÞ, which represents the fraction of the
security associations established until time t, and the
convergence (meeting) time tM , which is the time needed
to establish all the desired security associations. One
additional value of interest is the average meeting fre-
quency 1=tIM of nodes. Here, tIM is the node intermeeting
time. This value is important for assessing the frequency of
rekeying and the time necessary to perform key revocation.
In our simulations, we make use of the Random
Waypoint mobility model and we extend this model with
some new features; we call this new model the Restricted
Random Waypoint. In the conventional Random Waypoint
model, a node chooses its destination and its speed toward
this destination randomly. After arriving at the destination,
the node pauses for a certain period of time, and then
chooses its new destination and its speed. In the Restricted
Random Waypoint model, the nodes move in the same way
as in the Random Waypoint model, but their choice of
destination points is restricted to a number of fixed points
on the plane with some probability p. This means that, with
probability p, a node randomly chooses a point from a finite
set of destination points, and with probability 1 p, it
chooses as its destination a random point on the plane. We
call this model the Restricted Random Waypoint mobility
model. This model is closer to reality in the sense that users
normally do not randomly choose any point on a plane as
their destination, but they rather move to some meeting
points (e.g., meeting rooms, lounges, and restaurants)
where communication between users takes place. If p ¼ 1
and if the set of destination points is small, the convergence
time will be very small. On the contrary, if p ¼ 0, we have
the standard Random Waypoint mobility model and the
convergence time will be longer.
In this mobility model, two nodes can establish a security
association if they are in the security range of each other (for
the fully self-organized network) or in each others’ power
range (in the authority based network). The security range
is significantly smaller than the power range of mobile
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nodes and is the maximum range that is sufficient for the
secure side channel to be set up.
In all simulations, we use the same simulation area, (a
1,000 m  1,000 m square) and we set the number of nodes
to n ¼ 100. When the nodes hit the area border, they bounce
off under the same angle under which they hit the border.
The node maximum speed is set to 5 m/s (except in one
case on Fig. 2a, where it is 20 m/s), and the minimum speed
to 1 m/s [27]. The pause time is set to 100 s.
In Fig. 2, we observe the convergence rnsðtÞ and the node
meeting frequency. Fig. 2a illustrates that the friends
mechanism speeds up convergence proportionally to the
number of friends. Furthermore, this shows that, as
expected, a higher average speed of nodes results in a faster
convergence (and, therefore, a shorter convergence time).
The same figure also illustrates another very intuitive result:
The convergence is faster if the nodes gather at and around
meeting points. It is also interesting to observe that, in the
most favorable scenario (in which the security range is 100 m
and the network is controlled by a central authority),
40 percent of security associations are established in less
than 1,000 seconds (17 minutes). This is an important result,
given that, as we have shown in [10], this percentage of
security associations is sufficient to support secure routing.
Fig. 2b shows the node meeting frequency (two nodes), in
areas of various sizes. Here, we observe that the meeting
frequency is inversely proportional to the size of the area.
These results are in line with our analysis of the convergence
time andmeeting frequency of randomwalks [11], where we
show that the convergence time is proportional to N logN
and the meeting frequency is proportional to 2N . Here, N is
the size of the area in which the nodes move.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that mobility can help to
provide security inmobile networks.We have illustrated our
approach on two application scenarios in the area of mobile
adhoc networks: networkswith an offline authority and fully
self-organized networks. In the first scenario, a direct
establishment of security associations over the (one-hop)
radio link solves the well-known security-routing interde-
pendency problem. In the second scenario, we have shown
that the solution is intuitive to the users, as it mimics real-life
concepts (physical encounters and friends) and solves some
classical problems of security in distributed systems.
We have shown that our solution works both with
public-key and with symmetric cryptography and we have
provided the related protocols. We have studied the pace of
establishment of the security associations under various
mobility scenarios. In particular, we have extended the
Random Waypoint model by introducing the concept of
meeting points in order to be closer to human behavior. We
have shown that in self-organized scenarios, the set-up of
security associations can take several hours, while in the
case of networks controlled by central authorities, this time
can be as low as 20 minutes. We have further shown that the
vast majority of the security associations are set up in much
shorter time than the full set of security associations. This is
an important observation, as we have recently shown [10]
that secure routing is also possible in networks in which
only 40 percent of security associations are established.
Moreover, if the users are willing to set up security
associations, they can decide to move close to people of
their interest.
To the best of our knowledge, this research effort is the
first that shows how mobility can help to secure peer-to-
peer mobile networks.
In the future, we plan to study even more realistic and
more sophisticated mobility models, including those with
correlated mobility patterns [2]. We will further study how
an even incomplete set of security associations can be
exploited to perform crucial security operations. We also
intend to further investigate rekeying and key revocation
schemes. Finally, we intend to analyze the burden of the
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Fig. 2. Restricted Random waypoint simulation results; (a) average convergence, (b) meeting frequency. Here, f is the number of node’s friends, p is
the restriction probability, v is the node speed, and sr is the range within which the nodes can establish security associations. The results are shown
with 95 percent confidence intervals.
cryptographic functions on the processing units, especially
in the public-key case.
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